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ADJUDICATION OF UNIVERSAL FUNDING IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act")' updated and
changed the prior articulated goals of the Communications Act of 1934
("1934 Act") A key provision in the 1996 Act emphasizes the necessity
for universal telecommunications service in rural, high-price, and low-
population areas, creating a significant impact on telecommunications in
the western states.3 In the 1996 Act, the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC") took responsibility for discounting and even subsidiz-
ing telecommunication companies in furtherance of this goal.'
The stated purpose of the 1996 Telecommunications Act is, "[t]o
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications con-
sumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies."' In the 1996 Act, universal service is a key component of
the stated purpose.6
This paper will explain some of the controversies surrounding uni-
versal service, focusing on the funding provisions associated with the
1996 Act. Specifically, this paper examines how recent decisions in the
Tenth Circuit and Fifth Circuit regarding universal service funding pro-
visions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act will impact future adjudi-
cation of universal service funding issues. Thus far, no other circuit has
undertaken decisions regarding universal service funding provisions for
telecommunications.
Part I provides a background by reviewing current scholarly litera-
ture on the topic of universality. Part II examines the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Qwest Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission.7
This case raises a question of sufficiency of federal funding for universal
access.8 Part III examines the Fifth Circuit's decision regarding the
model used by the FCC to determine federal funding for universal serv-
ice in Alenco Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Com-
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 254 (1996).
2. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1934).
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 254.
4. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(3)(d).
5. Id. at Preamble.
6. See id.
7. 258 F.3d 1191 (2001).
8. See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191 (2001).
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mission.9 Part IV provides a critical analysis of the materials presented.
Finally, Part V provides conclusions and recommendations based on the
foregoing materials, and a look towards the effects that the adjudication
of these issues will have on future issues of funding for universal tele-
communications service.
I. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996'0 into
law on February 8, 1996." The 1996 Act came into being as a conglom-
eration of amendments to the Communications Act of 1934.12 The 1996
Act both enhances and supplements the provisions of the 1934 Act.
3
After decades of amending the Communications Act to deal with
emerging technologies e.g., cable, the Internet, cellular communication,
digital television, etc., the FCC presented its recommendations to Con-
gress. 4 Congress then passed the 1996 Act adopting new provisions and
solidifying amendments to the 1934 Act.'5 Thomas Krattenmaker as-
cribes the FCC's interest in revising the regulations concerning tele-
communication to the increasingly adaptable technology that allows peo-
ple to communicate with each other more easily, across longer distances,
and eliminating barriers to incorporating that technology into the tele-
communications marketplace.' 6
9. Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
It. Michael I. Myerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 252 (1997).
12. Myerson, supra note 11, at 252.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. "The goal of Congress was to create a legislative change as dramatic as the evolution
of the old-fashioned telephone, carrying voices over distant wires, into telecommunications, the
transmission of 'information,' including data and video, as well as aural communications." Id. at
253. See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J.
1, 3 (1996) ("The 1996 Act is a very lengthy and very detailed bill. Formally written as a series of
amendments and additions to the Federal Communications Commission's basic charter, the
Communications Act of 1934, the committee print of the law is Ill pages long."); Glen 0.
Robinson, "The 'New' Communications Act: A Second Opinion," 29 CONN. L. REV. 289, 304 (1996)
("The driving force behind the 1996 Act was to legislate the conditions that would permit more
competition into telecommunications markets. This was Congress' central ambition, and rightly
central; next to it all other parts of the Act pale in importance.").
16. See id.
Telecommunications technology is largely regarded as an advancement over smoke signal
technology because it can carry more information per second, carry it a greater distance, and provide
more security against surreptitious monitoring . . . we are witnessing a convergence of devices
accompanied by a plethora of transmission paths. The telecommunications receiver is a radio,
computer, television, telephone, VCR, and fax machine all rolled into one.
Id. Krattenmaker suggests that prior to the 1996 Act:
Confronting, and obstructing, these technological developments were (and, to some extent, still are)
a series of governmentally imposed entry barriers that sought to force the new and the old
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The 1996 Act, in contrast to prior legislation, emphasizes the im-
portance of competition in the telecommunications marketplace.' 7 Ac-
cording to Michael Myerson, Professor of Law at the University of Bal-
timore:
This law represents a vision of a telecommunications marketplace
where the flexibility and innovation of competition replaces the heavy
hand of regulation. It is based on the premise that technological
changes will permit a flourishing of telecommunications carriers, en-
gaged in head-to-head competition, resulting in a multitude of com-
munications carriers and programmers being made available to the
American consumer.18
Prior to the 1996 Act, local telephone companies held monopolies
over telephone service, but were not allowed to compete in long-distance
or in cable markets.' 9 The 1996 Act specifically aims to deregulate tele-
communications, so as to increase the amount of competition in the tele-
communications market, in direct contrast to prior legislation. 20 Prior to
the 1996 Act, the FCC effectively separated the various telecommunica-
tions components:
Balkanizing the industry, keeping one industry firmly secured to its
own, specified piece of the telecommunications revenue pie, was a
natural outcome of regulatory capture. Indeed, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission became a cartel-enforcement agency, one that
could reliably be called on by incumbents to formulate rules that
21
would make competitive entry economically impossible.
technologies into a Procrustean bed. These barriers attempted both to confine certain devices to
certain limited uses and to limit the transmission paths telecommunications providers might employ.
Id. See also Angela J. Campbell, "Universal Service Provisions: The "Ugly Duckling" of the 1996
Act," 29 CONN. L. REV. 187, 190 (1996).
Traditionally, universal service had been concerned with POTs because that was all that was
available. In recent years, with the wide variety of new telecommunications services becoming
available, it became clear that it was time to re-examine the definition of universal service .... The
1996 Act is significant in that it ends the debate over whether universal service needs to be redefined
by requiring the FCC to do so.
Id.
17. See Myerson, supra note 11, at 252.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 253. For example:
[All] of these assertions were true at the end of 1995 (and some still are): Television stations cannot
operate local cable systems; but cable systems must carry television stations. On the other hand,
firms sending multiple televisions signals to the home via satellite are effectively prevented from
carrying network television stations. Telephone companies cannot offer cable television and cable
television companies cannot offer telephony although both run wires for electronic communications
in the same houses.
Krattemaker. supra note 15, at 7.
20. See Myerson, supra note 11, at 254.
21. Thomas W. Hazlett, "Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on
Thomas G. Krattenmaker," 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 221 (1996).
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According to the FCC, the 1996 Act will, "remove the outdated barriers
that protect monopolies from competition and affirmatively promote
efficient competition ... ,22 By removing the barriers, "[p]olicy makers
believe (or profess to believe) that if the telephony, radio, and television
are to merge--or not to merge-that result should be driven by consum-
ers making choices in open markets that express their preferences."3
The FCC hopes to implement its goal of market competition, in part,
by encouraging universal service for telecommunications patrons.24 The
1934 Act also encouraged universal service, mandating regulation of
electronic communications to make them available to all citizens of the
United States.25
Historically, the FCC has had special policies addressing these con-
stituencies' unique telecommunications problems. At a minimum,
this language ratifies these efforts. It makes it clear for the future, that
"all the people of the United States" referenced in section 1 of the
1934 Communications Act really means all the people and that the
FCC should make special efforts to ensure that some Americans are
not underserved because of where they live or how much money they
make.26
The 1996 Act, however, expands on the universal service mandate and
includes provisions that will allow the Act to adapt to the ever-changing
technological innovations that impact modem telecommunication serv-
27ices.
The FCC included seven principles in the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act to justify and support universal service.' The specific provi-
22. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Part II, Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476, 45,479 (Aug. 29, 1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts.
1,20,51,90).
23. Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 7. But see The Honorable Hullihen Williams Moore,
Richard L. Cimerman, John L. Langhauser, Philip McClelland & Mark J. Mathis, "Local Exchange
Service In The Next Century-What Still Must Be Done To Bring Us Where We Want To Be?", 4
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, 8 (1996) ("Effective competition is not around the corner, because there
remains a tremendous amount of work to be done, both at the municipal, state, and the federal
levels.").
24. The FCC defines universal service as, "an evolving level of telecommunications services
that the Commission shall establish periodically under this section, taking into account advances in
telecommunications and information technologies and services." 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1 ).
25. See Myerson, supra note 11, at 266.
26. Campbell, supra note 16, at 196,
27. See id.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(l)-(7).
(b) Universal Service Principles.-The Joint Board and the Commission shall base policies for the
preservation and advancement of universal service on the following principles:
Quality and rates.-Quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.
Access to advanced services.-Access to advanced telecommunications and information services
should be provided in all regions of the Nation.
[Vol. 79:3
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sions that are cogent to this discussion deal with "[a]ccess in rural and
high cost areas, 2 9 "[e]quitable and nondiscriminatory contributions,"
3
and "[s]pecific and predictable support mechanisms., 3' These are the
provisions that cause great difficulty in determining the adequacy of
funding for implementing universal service.3 Professor Myerson raises
two important questions that must be considered in order to understand
the universal service requirement of the 1996 Act: (1) "what services
Access in rural and high cost areas-Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have access to telecommunications
and information services, including interexchange services and advanced telecommunications and
information services, that are reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas and
that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in
urban areas.
Equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions.-All providers of telecommunications services
should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement
of universal service.
Specific and predictable support mechanisms.-There should be specific, predictable and sufficient
Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
Access to advanced telecommunications services for schools, health care, and libraries.-
Elementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care providers, and libraries should have
access to advanced telecommunications services as described in subsection (h).
Additional principles.-Such other principles as the Joint Board and the Commission determine are
necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity and
are consistent with this Act.
Id. See also Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 21 (discussing the definition of universal service).
Campbell provides a useful explanation of the seven key provisions:
In developing universal service policies, the Joint Board and the FCC are to implement the seven
principles articulated in section 254(b). The first three principles address the type and quality of
services that should be available to consumers. The next two concern the mechanisms that will be
used to support universal service. The sixth principle addresses the special needs of schools,
libraries, and health care providers. The final principle permits consideration of any other principles
necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Campbell, supra note 16, at 194.
29. Myerson, supra note 11, at 266.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Additionally, Krattenmaker argues that the focus on universal service allows the FCC to
maintain control over entities that it claims should now be subject to the competitive conditions of
the marketplace:
The conclusion is the continuing conviction that markets for telecommunications services ought to
be governmentally managed so that they provide-and to some extent conceal-pro-social cross-
subsidies. Baldly stated, nonpredatory competition is not good if it leads to higher residential
subscription rates for basic telephone services.
Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 9. Campbell notes that there are difficulties with the funding
provisions, but notes:
The Act does not offer any details as to how the support mechanism will work. The NPRM does not
either; it merely lists a number of options and asks a series of questions. Until the support
mechanisms are developed and tested, it is too early to tell whether they will work as intended.
Although the Commission may fail to develop the perfect solution, even a flawed new system will
likely be an improvement over the present system.
Campbell, supra note 16, at 197. Similarly, Robinson notes that the universal service funding
provisions in the 1996 Act sidestep economics in favor of public good policy, "The measure is no
longer the measure of network value -to telecommunications users, it is a general social welfare
measure." Robinson, supra note 15, at 325.
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must be provided?"33; and (2) "how universal must their provision be?"4
Myerson does not answer the questions he raises; rather, he offers them
as touchstones for policymakers to look to when beginning to implement
the provisions of the 1996 Act. 35 Krattenmaker too asks, "Whence the
money?" 36 The 1996 Act itself leaves the answer to these questions to the
broad discretion of the FCC, providing that all telecommunications com-
panies must contribute to the implementation of universal service.
The FCC relies on both state and federal funding to support its uni-
versal service initiatives s. 3 The FCC formulated a system of contributions
by telecommunications companies and subsidies for instituting universal
service programs.39 Geography, income of consumers, and facilities (e.g.,
schools, healthcare facilities, etc.) are important factors in determining
the amount and type of subsidies provided under the 1996 Act.40 Ac-
cording to Dawson, "The 1996 Act expresses a fundamental commitment
to encourage competition in rural and high-cost areas so that customers
in these regions will receive the same benefits as their urban counter-
parts."'
33. Myerson, supra note 11, at 267.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 21. See also Robinson, supra note 15, at 323-24.
The value of the network to each subscriber is a function of the number of persons reached by the
network; each additional subscriber to the network thus confers benefits to the other network
subscribers; to the extent the benefit to the network as a whole--that is to the inframarginal user--is
greater than the price that the marginal user is willing to pay to subscribe there is an externality. In
such a case it is efficient to charge the inframarginal subscriber for some part of the costs of
adding the marginal subscriber to the network.
Id.
37. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(4).
38. See Emily Dawson, Universal Service High-Cost Subsidy Reform: Hindering Cable-
Telephony and Other Technological Advancements in Rural and Insular Regions, 53 FED. COMM.
L.J. 117, 120 (2000).
The universal service program functions as a cooperative effort between the individual states and the
federal government. The individual states may independently develop separate universal service
programs as long as the provisions do not conflict with the FCC's general rules governing subsidy
allocation and find support in "specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms ... that do not rely
on or burden federal universal service support mechanisms."
Id.
39. See id.
40. See Campbell, supra note 16, at 202-03.
The fact that low income and rural consumers are specifically mentioned in the Act gives further
impetus to the FCC and states to make sure that people who might otherwise be left behind are
included. In effect, the Act gives the federal and state regulatory commissions a mandate to ensure
that the disparities between the haves and have-nots are not increased. The special attention paid to
schools, libraries and health care providers also promises real benefits for society. Schools are
training the next generation of American citizens and workers. Libraries are the traditional source of
information in communities. Since schools and libraries are open to everyone, they are good places
to begin to tackle the problem of the haves and have-nots.
Id.
41. Dawson, supra note 38, at 120.
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Subsidies for telecommunications companies come in a variety of
forms. One example is the cost-shifting mechanism that shifts a portion
of the cost of service for high-cost areas to consumers in low-cost areas. 2
Additionally, the FCC uses forward-looking formulas to calculate the
amount of federal support to grant to each company for its universal
service activity:
The new model will enable the FCC to design more efficient net-
works based upon the geographic location of customers and necessary
upgrades in infrastructure. Using this model, the FCC can input cost
variables, such as network components, into the system to estimate
the forward-looking costs of providing telecommunications services
to these high-cost areas. From these data, the FCC will determine in
which geographic regions carriers will be eligible to receive subsi-
dies.43
Unfortunately, the FCC's subsidy calculations have met with criti-
cism from scholars." One of the arguments raised is that uncertainty in
the calculations may not provide an accurate determination of the amount
of support necessary to provide universal service.4 ' The uncertainty
comes from the manner in which the FCC determines whether a carrier is
eligible for the subsidies based solely on statewide calculations:
42. • See id. "[Slubsidies support the programs, shifting some of the costs associated with
providing service in high-cost areas to customers in lower-cost regions." See also Markenzy
Lapointe, Universal Service and the Digital Revolution: Beyond the Telecommunications Act of
1996,25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 74 (1999) ("[U]niversal service has been supported
through a system of subsidization, which shifted costs from one group of high-cost customers to a
low-cost group.").
43. Dawson, supra note 38, at 122. Earlier the author explains why rural and insular areas
have higher telecommunications costs, "[rlegions that have fewer customers over which to spread
fixed costs, and other factors such as less technologically advanced networks and rugged terrain,
have inherently higher service costs. The universal service program provides subsidies to high-cost
regions to ensure affordable telecommunications services to citizens in these areas." Id. at 118.
44. See id. See also Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 21-22.
Universal service is now an explicitly articulated goal of telecommunications regulation. It is to be
achieved by levying a proportionate tax on all telecommunications service providers, which should
make more visible both the nature and amounts of the cross-subsidies encompassed within the
universal service program .... Exactly what services will be encompassed within the concept of
universal service remains quite unclear, however, because no specific or fixed meaning may be
ascribed to the list of items that make up "universal service"; it is an "evolving level" of services to
be established "periodically" by the FCC, not just a basic dial tone.
Id.
45. See Dawson, supra note 38 at 122. See also Robinson, supra note 15, at 324.
A more basic problem is determining where the benefit-cost ratio that justifies the subsidy ends.
Though conventional economic theory says that the inframarginal subscriber gains from extending
the network, no one with any economic sense at all would say that the net gain extends all the way to
100% participation. Although no one has found a means of calculating the cross-over point between
benefits to the inframarginal user and the cost of adding marginal users, that point occurs well short
of 100%.
Id.
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Therefore, a carrier can only receive high-cost subsidies for services
rendered in a particular state if the "carrier's average cost of provid-
ing service in [that] state exceeds 135% of [the] national average per
line." The problem is that calculating the cost of phone service in ru-
ral and high-cost areas is notoriously difficult, and the FCC has even
acknowledged this potential uncertainty in the system.46
The following cases and analysis will examine these problems in further
detail, and illuminate some of the issues that still remain to be resolved.
II. QWEST CORPORATION V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47
Qwest, along with other telecommunications companies,4' brought
suit to challenge the FCC's funding for universal service provisions, in-
cluding "local telephone service and access to emergency, directory-
assistance, and long distance services. 49 As discussed above, costs of
providing universal service in a rural area are much higher than those for
providing the same service in an urban center.5° To offset these costs
"states and the federal government have established policies that support
access to basic services in high cost areas."5' The 1996 Act requires:
(d) Telecommunications Carrier Contribution-Every telecommuni-
cations carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services
shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the
specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the
Commission to preserve and advance universal service ... (f) State
Authority-A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the
Commission's rules to preserve and advance universal service. Every
telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate telecommunica-
tions services shall contribute, on an equal and nondiscriminatory ba-
46. Dawson, supra note 38, at 122.
47. 258 F.3d 1191 (2001).
48. Other parties to the litigation are: AT&T Corp., Rural Telephone Coalition, Vermont
Department of Public Service, State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California, The Maine Public Utilities Commission, Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc.,
WorldCom, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., Bell Atlantic-New
Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Washington,
D.C., Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., New York Telephone Company, New England Telephone
and Telegraph Company, The Wyoming Public Service Commission, and GTE Service Corporation.
Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1191.
49. See id. at 1195.
50. See id. See also Alenco, 201 F.3d at 617.
Rural LEC's face special obstacles. The cost of providing telephone service varies with population
density, because dispersed populations require longer wires and permit lesser economies in
installation, service, and maintenance. Also relevant are geographic characteristics, for climate and
certain types of terrain make service calls and repairs more costly. Rural areas where telephone
customers are dispersed and terrain is unaccommodating are therefore the most expensive to serve.
Id.
51. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1195.
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sis, in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and ad-
vancement of universal service in that State. 2
Qwest did not challenge the theory behind universal service." Rather, it
questioned two of the universality principles in the 1996 Telecommuni-
cations Act that state:
(3) Access in rural and high cost areas--Consumers in all regions of
the Nation, including low-income consumers and those in rural, in-
sular, and high cost areas should have access to telecommunications
and information services, that are reasonably comparable to those
provided in urban areas and that are available at rates that are rea-
sonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban ar-
eas . .. (5) Specific and predictable support mechanisms-There
should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State
14mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
The FCC attempted to implement these provisions in a series of FCC
Orders.5 The Orders promulgated the methods the FCC will use to im-
plement its policy directives. This case is a direct challenge to the
FCC's Ninth and Tenth Orders.57
Before implementing the principles contained in the 1996 Act, the
FCC generated several orders and finally decided to follow the guide-
lines for funding contained in its Ninth Order." The Tenth Circuit ex-
plained the funding mechanisms as follows:
To determine the amount of money that a state may receive, the FCC
employs a two-part method. First, using its cost model, it set a
benchmark at 135% of the national average cost per line. Second, it
computes the average cost per line within a given state. If the state-
wide average cost exceeds the benchmark, then the FCC provides
funding for costs in excess of the benchmark.59
In its Tenth Order, the FCC figured out which "input values" it
would use in the model and "anticipate[d] updating the model as tech-
nology and other conditions change." 6 The Tenth Circuit consolidated
the claims of Qwest and the other telecommunications companies . 6' The
consolidated claims can be summarized in three basic arguments: (1) the
52. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(3)(d)-(f); See also Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1199.
53. See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191 (2001).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 254(2)(b)(3)-(5).
55. See Ninth Report & Order and Eighteenth Order on Reconsideration P 1, FCC 99-306,
CC Docket No. 96-45 (Nov. 2, 1999). See also Tenth Report and Order, FCC 99-304, CC Docket
Nos. 96-45, 97-160 (Nov. 2, 1999).
56. See id.
57. See Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1196.
58. See id. at 1197.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1198.
61. See id.
499
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
FCC should not rely on the states to fund its universal service
provisions; 62 (2) the FCC failed to appropriately and explicitly define the
reasoning behind the adoption of the 135% benchmark, thereby making
their calculations arbitrary and capricious;63 (3) the funding mechanisms
proposed by the FCC are inadequate to support the FCC's universal
service vision.6 These arguments in the consolidated claim deal specifi-
cally with the FCC's Ninth Order. Additionally, Qwest's final argument
was that the funding model proposed in the FCC's Tenth order violates
65the Administrative Procedure Act. Each of the arguments put forth by
the telecommunications companies in the consolidated claim, and the
Tenth Circuit's response to these arguments, will be examined in detail
in the following sections.
A. States' Responsibility for the Funding of Universal Service Provi-
sions
According to the record, "The FCC acknowledges that the Ninth
Order will result in reasonably comparable rates only if the states imple-
ment their own universal-service policies." 6 The Tenth Circuit partially
based its decision, to reverse and remand this portion of the case for fur-
ther proceedings, on the FCC's recognition of the necessity of state
funding for universal service, and its failure to provide any inducements
for the states to implement their own universal service policies, in com-
pliance with the requirements of the 1996 Act.67
The Tenth Circuit did not fail to recognize that Congress intended to
encourage a partnership between the states and the federal government in
order to promote universal service across the United States.6' Nor did it
fail to recognize the FCC's necessary dependence on state support.69 In
reaching its decision, therefore, the Tenth Circuit rejected Qwest's argu-
ment that "the FCC must alone support the full costs of universal serv-
ice., 70 However, the Court did not let the FCC off the hook, stating that,
"the FCC may not simply assume that the states will act on their own to
preserve and advance universal service. It remains obligated to create
62. See id.
63. See Qwest, 259 F.3d at 1198.
64. See id.
65. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2001). See also Qwest, 258 F.3d at
1205.
66. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202-03.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1203.
A State may adopt regulations to provide for additional definitions and standards to preserve and
advance universal service within that State only to the extent that such regulations adopt additional
specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do not
rely on or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.
47 U.S.C. §254 (c)(3)(d). See also Ninth Order, supra note 55, at P 56.
69. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202-03.
70. Id. at 1203-04.
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some inducement-a 'carrot' or a 'stick,' .. . for the states to assist in
implementing the goals of universal service.
B. FCC's Failure to Define Key Terms and Justify 135% Benchmark
1. Defining "Reasonably Comparable" and "Sufficient"
Several of the terms used by the FCC in its discussion of its univer-
sal service provisions were at issue in this part of the court's opinion.
First, the FCC provides a definition of "reasonably comparable" as, "a
fair range of urban/rural rates both within a state's borders, and among
states nationwide.,12 The Tenth Circuit found that this definition is too
ambiguous to be useful to states attempting to implement universal serv-
ice, even after further explanation by the FCC.73 The court rejected the
additional definitions as imprecise standards that are no more useful than
the original definition.4
The second term that the FCC inadequately defined is "sufficient."
The Tenth Circuit declared that the FCC asserted that the federal support
would be sufficient.75 The FCC's statement was a conclusion, not ex-
planatory, and it was "inadequate to enable appellate review of the suffi-
ciency of the federal mechanism and, if accepted, would provide only a
circular argument in support of the FCC's position.
76
Once again, in their review of the ambiguous terms, the Tenth Cir-
cuit gave the FCC the benefit of the doubt by attempting to figure out if
the definitions were "reasonable constructions of the statute. 77 If the
71. Id. at 1204.
72. Ninth Order, supra note 55, at P 54.
73. Qwest, 259 F.3d at 1201. The court examines the FCC's definition in the best light
possible, examining several other definitions for reasonably comparable, before coming to its
decision:
At least twice, the FCC has provided what purport[s] to be further definitions of "reasonably
comparable":
(1) "Support levels must be sufficient to prevent pressure from high costs and the development of
competition from causing unreasonable increases in rates above current, affordable levels."




75. Ninth Order, supra note 55, P 56.
76. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202.
77. Id. See also Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If, the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.... If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute .... Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.
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definitions had fallen within a reasonable construction the ambiguity
would be admissible; however, the Tenth Circuit found that "deference
[to the FCC] is inappropriate" because the definitions are "[w]ithout a
'limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act."'"8 The court
remanded the case, requiring the FCC to more precisely define "reasona-
bly comparable" and "sufficient" in a way that is "reasonably related to
the statutory principles. 79
2. Justifying the 135% Benchmark
In examining whether the FCC sufficiently justified its 135%
benchmark as a method of attaining reasonable comparability and suffi-
cient funding for universal service, the court examined the FCC's justifi-
cations for choosing that benchmark, and other documents submitted by
related parties.80 Similar to the court's discussion of the definitions, the
Tenth Circuit, in its discussion of the 135% benchmark, tried to give
deference to the FCC's expertise as an administrative agency stating,
"[i]f, however, the FCC's 135% benchmark actually produced urban and
rural rates that were reasonably comparable, however those terms are
defined, we would likely uphold the mechanism.",8' The FCC attempted
to justify its benchmark by discussing the range of percentages from
which it had chosen, and that it had chosen the midpoint between appro-
priate guidelines. 2
The Tenth Circuit recognized that any determination by the FCC of
a benchmark is likely to be at least partially arbitrary, but strongly de-
nounced the FCC for failing to uphold its duty as an expert agency:
We find these justifications insufficient to support the benchmark.
The FCC is not a mediator whose job is to pick the "midpoint" of a
range or to come to a "reasonable compromise" among competing
positions. As an expert agency, its job is to make rational and in-
formed decisions on the record before it in order to achieve the prin-
78. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202 (internal cites omitted). "[T]he [1996] Act requires the FCC to
apply some limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act." AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).
79. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202.
80. See id. at 1202.
81. Id. The court reached this argument after determining that instead of actually coming up
with a comparison of rural and urban rates, the FCC substituted a comparison of nationwide and
statewide averages, even though such empirical data had been presented to it by concerned parties.
Id.
82. See id.
The FCC gave four justifications for setting the benchmark at 135%: (1) It "falls within the range
recommended by the Joint Board," 115%-150%; (2) such a level is "consistent with the precedent of
the existing support mechanism," which uses a range of 115-160%; (3) that level is "near the
midpoint" of the current range; and (4) it is 'reasonable compromise of commenters' proposals.
See also Ninth Order, supra note 55, at P 55.
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ciples set by Congress. Merely identifying some range and then
picking a compromise figure is not rational decision-making.83
The court's decision to remand the case for more precise definition,
and a better explanation of the benchmark, had ramifications on the rest
of the case.4
C. Sufficiency of Funding for Universal Service
Because the Tenth Circuit determined that the FCC failed to ade-
quately define "reasonably comparable" and "sufficient," and that the
FCC did not adequately explain its benchmark, the court concluded that
it was unable to "review the rationality of the Ninth Order., 85 The court
also stated that, "[b]ecause we remand for further consideration, we need
not address at this stage Petitioners' contention that the actual level of
funding is too low to be 'sufficient' to support universal service.
8 6
D. Challenges to the Tenth Order
Qwest's main challenge to the Tenth Order focused on the FCC's
choice of computer language used in the computation of cost models.87
Qwest also challenged several of the subroutines chosen for use by the
FCC.88 Subroutines are a sequence of programming instructions used
internally by the computer to perform specific tasks - in this case gener-
ating cost models. The Tenth Circuit deferred to the FCC's expertise on
the technical aspects of computer programming stating, "[aibsent the
most unusual circumstances, the FCC is far better situated than is this
court to decide basic technical specifications. . . . While Qwest takes
issue with the choice of Turbo Pascal, it has not convinced us that this
choice was so manifestly unreasonable as to be unlawful. 89 Ultimately,
in order to find in Qwest's favor on this point, Qwest would have to pro-
duce evidence that "the model overall produces such inaccurate results
that it cannot form the basis of rational decision-making." 9 The tele-
communications corporations use the computer programs at issue to de-
termine rates and calculate costs of providing universal service in rural
and high cost areas. 9'
The Tenth Circuit's decision in this case revolved around balancing
the FCC's expertise with the arbitrary nature of administrative decision-
making. In a well-drawn opinion, the court gave appropriate deference to
83. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202.
84. See id at 1204.
85. Id. at 1205.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Tenth Order, supra note 55, at P 17.
89. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1206.
90. Id.
91. See id.
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the agency's expertise, while still requiring the FCC's decisions to fall
within the rational reasoning test.92 In the final result, the court reversed
and remanded the Ninth Order for further proceedings, and affirmed the
Tenth Order.93 Thus, issues of sufficiency of funding remain open at this
point. In Alenco v. FCC,94 the Fifth Circuit also examined the issue of
sufficiency. 95
III. ALENCO COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
Similar to the challenges raised in Qwest, the Petitioners in Alenco
challenged the definition and explanation of "sufficient." 97 However,
these Petitioners, local telephone service providers, challenged the suffi-
ciency requirement on different grounds.98 Petitioners claim that the FCC
orders99 are, "inconsistent with the statutory requirements of the [1996]
Act; arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act; violative of the Takings Clause; and in noncompliance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act."'' °
The FCC's universal service provisions require funding,' °' therefore:
[t]o meet its historic mandate of universal service, the FCC has es-
tablished a universal service fund to subsidize high-cost rural LEC's
to reduce the rates they must charge to their customers. A LEC is eli-
gible for a subsidy if its operating expenses-its 'loop costs'-are
fifteen percent or more above the national average.02
The administration of this universal service fund was at issue in this
case, especially changes in the administrative procedures that limit sub-
sidies and make funding portable, as well as the use of inflation indices
instead of industry averages to adjust the benchmark.'3 Generally the
92. See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 259 F.3d 1191 (2001).
93. See id. at 1207.
94. 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
95. See Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
96. 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
97. See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 614.
98. See id.
99. Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-45, 12 F.C.C. Rcd 8776 (1997). Report and Order
in CC Docket Nos. 96-45, 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, 95-72, 13 FCC Rcd 5318 (1997).
100. Id. (internal cites omitted).
101. 47 U.S.C. §254 (c)(3)(d)-(e).
102. Alenco, 201 F.3d at 617.
103. See id. Petitioners' argue that:
First, they oppose the continued imposition of a cap on growth in fund expenditures, which cap
limits total available support to the previous year's level, adjusted for growth in the number of
working loops. Second, they object to a new cap on the amount of corporate operations expenses that
can be included in the loop cost calculation .... Third, the Order makes the subsidy portable,
following the customer who switches service from one LEC to another. Petitioners claim that
portability violates the principle of predictable funding. Fourth, beginning January 1, 2000, the
Order imposes an annual inflation index on the loop cost eligibility benchmark . . . replacing the
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Petitioners' arguments against implementation of these standards and the
benchmark fall into two categories: (1) a challenge to the FCC's exper-
tise on the subject; and (2) the failure of the FCC Order to provide suffi-
cient funding under the provisions of the 1996 Act.'°4 Each of these
challenges is examined separately below.
A. Expertise of the FCC
In order to determine whether an expert agency's methodology falls
within its areas of expertise and discretion, the courts must decide
whether Congress made intentional precise statements on the question at
issue.'05 If Congress did not, then the court may only reverse the agency's
decision if the construction falls outside of a "permissible construction"
of the statute, or if it is "arbitrary and capricious. ' 0 Under a final stan-
dard of review, the court must decide if the agency's decision was rea-
sonable and if there is a "rational relationship between the facts found
and the choice made."' '° If the decision is within these specific confines,
then the court must defer to the agency's expert opinion on the matter
presented. "
According to the Fifth Circuit, "[w]e note that Congress obviously
intended to rely primarily on FCC discretion, and not vigorous judicial
review, to ensure satisfaction of the Act's dual mandates. '9 In an earlier
decision, the court explained its position on universal service regulation
further:
To be sure, the FCC's reason for adopting this methodology is not
just to preserve universal service. Rather, it is also trying to encour-
age local competition by setting the cost models at the "most effi-
cient" level so that carriers will have the incentive to improve opera-
tions. As long as it can reasonably argue that the methodology will
former approach of recalculating a fresh benchmark periodically, based on updated estimates of
industry averages. Finally, the Order disallows additional service support when a rural LEC acquires
and upgrades another exchange, despite petitioners' claim that such mergers are efficient and should
be encouraged.
Id. (italics in original; internal cites omitted).
104. See id. at 620.
105. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.




Universal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall
establish periodically under this section, taking into account advances in telecommunications and
information technologies and services. The Joint Board in recommending, and the Commission in
establishing, the definition of the services that are supported by Federal universal service support
mechanisms shall consider the extent to which such telecommunications services-
are essential to education, public health, or public safety; have, through the operation of market
choices by customers, been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers;
are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers; and
are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1).
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provide sufficient support for universal service, however, it is free,
under the deference we afford it under Chevron step-two, to adopt a
methodology that serves its other goal of encouraging local competi-
tion.1"0
The Chevron test requires that when a court reviews the construction of
an agency action it must first determine "whether Congress has directly
spoken" on the issue,
[i]f, however the court determines Congress has not directly ad-
dressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply im-
pose its own construction on the statute .... Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.""
The court found that the petitioners failed to meet the "high eviden-
tiary standard" necessary to show that the FCC's methodology was "ar-
bitrary and capricious.""' 2
B. Petitioners Challenge to Sufficiency
The Fifth Circuit also examined the Petitioners' challenge to suffi-
ciency and concluded that the Petitioners were mistaken in their inter-
pretation of the sufficiency requirements because they failed to recognize
that universal service and local competition are dual goals, not mutually
exclusive of one another."3 Petitioners' arguments focused on the suffi-
ciency of funding for companies providing universal service. However,
the court first examined the provisions of the Act itself, stating:
The Act only promises universal service, and that is a goal that re-
quires sufficient funding of customers, not providers. So long as there
is sufficient and competitively neutral funding to enable all customers
to receive basic telecommunications services, the FCC has satisfied
the Act and is not further required to ensure sufficient funding of
every local telephone provider as well."
4
The court then began its analysis of the Petitioners' argument re-
garding the specific funding provisions."' The Fifth Circuit concluded
110. Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 410 (5th Cir. 1999).
111. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
113. See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 620. "The Act does not guarantee all local telephone service
providers a sufficient return on investment; quite the contrary, it is intended to introduce competition
into the market. Competition necessarily brings the risk that some telephone service providers will
be unable to compete." Id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
[E]xcessive funding may itself violate the sufficiency requirements of the Act. Because universal
service is funded by a general pool subsidized by all telecommunications providers-and thus
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that funding caps have been established by the FCC to promote effi-
ciency and to "combat wasteful spending," and as such are not violative
of the agency's discretion."6 The Court stated, "The proposed 115% rule
is thus a wholly reasonable exercise of the Commission's legitimate
power to combat abusive spending; absent the proposed rule, the regula-
tions provide no incentive to keep costs down.""'
Petitioners argued that portability of funding, allowing the subsidies
to move with the customer when they changed telecommunications pro-
viders, violated the "statutory principle of predictability.""' ' 8 The Court
rejected this argument because predictability is only a principle in the
Act, not a specific statutory command. Thus it is. within the FCC's expert
discretion to "ignore" predictability in implementing the 1996 Act's uni-
versal service and sufficiency provisions. "9 Additionally, the Court rec-
ognized that sufficiency of funding can be attained regardless of which
carrier is serving the customer's needs, thus the Petitioners were not
asking for predictability of funding, but trying to exempt themselves
from market competition-the second prong of the Act's goals.'20
The court rejected the Petitioners' final two arguments-regarding
changing the calculation of the benchmark by using the inflation and
failure to continue funding for telecommunications companies that
merge-because both of these areas are within the FCC's discretion as
measures instituted to assist in the transition from one funding model to
another.' 2' The Fifth Circuit rejected the petition for review, as a whole,
because:
... [the petitioners] fundamentally misunderstand a primary purpose
of the Communications Act-to herald and realize a new era of com-
petition in the market for local telephone service while continuing to
pursue the goal of universal service. They therefore confuse the re-
quirement of sufficient support for universal service within a market
in which telephone service providers compete for customers ... with
a guarantee of economic success for all providers, a guarantee that
conflicts with competition. 
2
indirectly by the customers--excess subsidization in some cases may detract from universal service
by causing rates unnecessarily to rise, thereby pricing some consumers out of the market.
Id.
116. Alenco, 201 F.3d at 620.
117. Order, supra note 100, PP 283-85, 307.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5).
119. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 411-12.
120. See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 622. "The methodology governing subsidy disbursements is
plainly stated and made available to LEC's. What petitioners seek is not merely predictable funding
mechanisms, but predictable market outcomes. Indeed, what they wish is protection from
competition, the very antithesis of the Act." Id.
121. See id. at 622.
122. Id. at 625.
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In sum, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Petitioners' claims because all
of the FCC Orders they challenged fell squarely within the discretion of
the FCC as an administrative agency.
IV. CRITICAL EVALUATION
Since 1996, the universal service funding mechanisms contained in
the Telecommunications Act,13 and a variety of FCC orders subsequent
to the 1996 Act, have been subject to a variety of criticisms.' Most of
the criticisms can be categorized as either dealing with the adequacy of
funding, or mechanisms for establishing who gets funding, how much
funding they receive, and how funding will be distributed.'2
Thus far it seems as if the courts have been consistent in their rul-
ings, and rightly so. It is true that the 1996 Act advocates the opening of
local telephony markets to competition. 26 However, the 1996 Act does
not leave telecommunications completely deregulated.2 2 To do so would
leave a vacuum and cause confusion for both the consumers and the tele-
communications corporations because no one would have control over
the implementation of the universal service provision of the 1996 Act.
The FCC, in the 1996 Act, recognized and responded to 60 years of
technological innovation, and provided a mechanism for continuing to
monitor and respond to emerging technologies in the telecommunications
field. 28 Congress granted universal service an elevated position in the
1996 Act, and by doing so, made great strides to act in the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity, especially for those in rural, high-cost
129areas.
The funding provisions contained in the 1996 Act are not legislative
perfection. However, both the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit exam-
ined sufficiency requirements, and recognized that the court is not the
appropriate body to determine funding provisions for an administrative
agency's regulation.' 3 The FCC holds an interesting position in the uni-
versal service funding debate, in that, the FCC proposed the regulation,
wrote the funding provisions, and yet advocates at least partial deregula-
tion of the telecommunications industry. 3' If that seems conflicting, it is.
123. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
124. See Myerson, supra note 11. See also Krattenmaker, supra note 15; and Campbell, supra
note 16.
125. See Dawson, supra note 38. See also Lapointe, supra note 42; Robinson, supra note 15;
and Myerson, supra note 11.
126. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See 47 U.S.C. § 254.
130. See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191 (2001); Alenco Communications, Inc, v. FCC,
201 F.3d 620 (2000).
131. 47 U.S.C. §254. The 1996 Telecommunications Act was the product of FCC proposals,
"An Act ... to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher
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Thus, not only was it prudent of the courts to defer to the FCC's exper-
tise in this area, it was absolutely necessary.
This is not to say that the FCC deserves, or that the courts provided
absolute discretion in the application of its provisions. The Tenth Circuit
left open the issue of whether the funding mechanisms provided suffi-
cient funding for the promulgation of universal service across the United
States for two reasons: (1) the FCC failed to adequately define its terms;
and (2) it failed to justify its choice of benchmark values.'32 The court
gave the FCC the opportunity to use its expertise to redefine its terms
before the court stepped in and usurped the FCC's authority. 33 This deci-
sion was appropriate because it gave all parties involved the opportunity
to continue discussing these issues. Since universal service is an evolving
concept, it would be impractical for the courts to close the revolving door
to the courthouse, foreclosing the opportunity for parties to obtain judi-
cial review of these issues.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Alenco, "34 completely sidestepped the
issue of whether funding for universal service provisions was adequate"3
by placing the burden on the FCC as an expert agency and deferring to
its expertise. 36 The choice of benchmarks and calculation of who gets
what funding, was justified based on the FCC's discretion, and the court
chose not to interfere with the discretionary function of an administrative
agency.37 Sidestepping of the issue, however, does not constitute a flaw
in judicial reasoning. The court essentially acknowledged its own limita-
tions in making decisions regarding funding. " 8 The court's function is
only to oversee the agency to ensure that it does not exceed the authority
granted to it by Congress. 39 It is not the court's job to interfere with the
inner workings of the FCC or to make factual determinations that will
influence the agency's ability to perform its duties.' °
The sidestepping by the court of key issues in determining suffi-
ciency appropriately leaves the determination of discretionary issues in
the hands of the FCC, while retaining the court's ability to resolve these
quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment
of new telecommunications technologies." Subsequent clarifications and explanations came in the
form of FCC orders dealing with administrative details, in this case universal service funding
provisions. See also Order, supra note 99, PP 283-85, 307; and Report and Order in CC Docket No.
9645, 12 FCC Rcd 8776 (1997). Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 9645, 96-262, 94-1,91-213,
95-72, 13 FCC Rcd 5318 (1997).
132. See Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1201-02.
133. See id. at 1202.
134. 201 F.3d 620 (2000).
135. See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 619-20.
136. See id.
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issues judicially issues if the FCC fails to do so, or oversteps its discre-
tionary boundaries.
V. WHAT COMES NEXT? UNRAISED AND UNRESOLVED FUNDING
ISSUES
One issue that was not raised in either Qwest or Alenco is how tech-
nological innovations will effect the universal service provisions. One
commentator believes that the new subsidy system, based on geographic
location, will create a gap in universal service in direct opposition to
what the 1996 Act intended:
Technological advancements in the telecommunications industry
continually challenge universal service and efforts to ensure that all
Americans have access to comparable services at competitive prices.
Implementing new technology generally reduces costs and provides
higher-quality service for customers because updates make systems
more efficient; consequently, carriers may pass these savings on to
consumers. Technological advances executed in low-cost areas fur-
ther polarize consumers' telecommunications access, as urban areas
receive improved service at lower rates. Meanwhile, service in rural
and insular areas deteriorates, creating a situation where the rich get
richer, and the poor get poorer.141
The next challenge to the funding provisions for universal service
will likely examine the equitable distribution of funds. Rather than sim-
ply looking at the sufficiency of funds, the courts will next have to look
at the manner of distribution. Questions remain as to whether the FCC's
funding criteria adequately assign the monies collected from LECs, and
whether federal funding will reach the areas most in need of universal
service subsidies. This is not a static examination. As new technology
emerges, the FCC, or the courts if the FCC fails in its duty to do so, must
re-evaluate universal service funding and distribution mechanisms to
confirm that the goals of "reasonably comparable service" at "reasonably
comparable rates" in "rural, insular, and high cost areas" are being at-
tained, or at least attempted.
4 2
In sum, the 1996 Telecommunications Act showcases the FCC's
commitment to and Congressional support of universal service. 43 It is the
first legislation in the history of telecommunications to definitively ex-
press this commitment and as such is a step in the right direction. The
FCC has embarked on a journey into uncharted territory with this portion
of the 1996 Act, therefore it is under enormous pressure to make sure
that all of the provisions work as expected. Invariably, there will be liti-
gation regarding the implementation of these regulations. Therefore it is
141. Dawson, supra note 38, at 123.
142. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3).
143. See id.
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important for all parties involved i.e., litigators, telecommunications
companies, the FCC, and consumers, to remember the spirit of the regu-
lation, and to be vigilant in its administration and adjudication.
It is also important to recognize that conflict between competitors is
a necessary component of integrating this legislation into the telecom-
munications environment. However, this conflict should be channeled
into appropriate arenas, so as to further the goals of the 1996 Act. First,
limitations on universal service must be recognized. It would be confus-
ing and unrealistic to believe that in a market economy 100% of citizens
will ever have universal service. Thus, the FCC, taking into account the
research and recommendations of consumer groups, public interest
groups, and telecommunications companies, should promulgate realistic
goals. These goals should specifically target groups and facilities that
have been neglected in the past, while recognizing that doing so will
encumber established telecommunications companies. Secondly, the
FCC should take heed of the courts' recommendations, in these cases,
and provide inducements to the states and incumbent telecommunica-
tions companies for promoting universal service in their respective areas.
Finally, the courts should continue examining each case and promote
universal service by deferring as much as possible to the FCC's discre-
tion.
CONCLUSION
The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the door for scholars,
attorneys, telecommunications companies, and consumers to grapple
with the conflicts arising from the emergence of new technology.'44 The
cases and articles discussed throughout this paper are the keys to under-
standing and implementing the universal service funding provisions
contained in the 1996 Act.'45 Whether the goal of universal service will
ever be achieved remains to be seen. However, the 1996 Act elevated the
status of universal service to a level where it can no longer be ignored.
Jennifer Hargroves
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